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Bachaquero - (1935-1941)
See also : Bachaquero -(1946-1952)
The "Bachaquero" (4,193 gross tons), dated from 1937, when the Furness Shipbuilding
Company Ltd., delivered her.
"Bachaquero" approaching La Salina on the lake Maracaibo.
LST "Bachaquero" after conversion to to a Tank Landing Ship.
"Bachaquero" entering Havana, Cuba in 1947.
( Photo thanks to Dan Jensen )
( Photo thanks to Harold Appleyard )
"Petro Lago", ex. "Esso Bachquero", ex. "Bachaquero".
Additonal information :
BACHAQUERO - 1937 BR 2 Triple steam engines (aft) (12 knots)
4,890 GRT for Lago Shipping Co., Ltd., London Measurements, 371.1 x 64.2
Tanker built by Furness SB. Co., Ltd., Haverton Hill-on-Tees Buildingnr. # 266
(1941 - 1945 Admiralty requisition - conv. to tank landing ship)
1946 - Panama Transport Co., Panama PA
1952 - ESSO BACHAQUERO, Cia. de Petroleo Lago, Maracaibo, VE
1958 - PETRO LAGO, Maritima Aragua, S.A., Maracaibo
Broken up at Briton Ferry 1960 by T. W. Ward, Ltd., arrived 15.06.1960 in tow.
"Bachaquero" was build in 1935. From 1941 untill 1945 required by the Admirality and converted
to a Tank landing Ship (F.110). Returned to their owners in 1945. Renamed as "Esso Bachaquero"
in 1952. Sold as "Petro Lago" in 1956 and scrapped in Cardiff in 1960.
Ship Report for "BACHAQUERO"
[ 1941 converted to tank landing ship, reverted 1946 ] -
1952 ESSO BACHAQUERO - 1958 PETRO LAGO
Scrapped at Briton Ferry 15.06.1960.
FURNESS SHIPBUILDING COMPANY LTD., HAVERTON HILL
Landing Ships Tank (LST).
The demands for the first landing ships tank/LSTs originated in 1940 when requirements were made for a ships that could
land tanks direct an to a beach anywhere in the world. This presented the difficulty of shallow draught ocean-going ships:
an unhappy combination at any time. The problem was tackled in two ways; first by converting suitable mercantile tonnage,
and then by designing and building a small class of special ships everi before any experience had been
obtained with the first group.
Three medium-sized tankers, designed to pass over the restrictive bars of Lake Maracaibo, were selected for conversion
because of their shallow draught. Even then their draught was such that they grounded sufficiently far off the beach that
they required an articulated bow, ramp to span the stretch of water between ship and shore; but they clearly indicated the
feasibility of the LST concept. Historically, they were the first LSTs. a fact not without passing interest; but they possessed
too many inherent disadvantages to be regarded as prototypes for the future.
The overriding feature of the naval-designed vessels was that speed was considerably increased, as the speed of the
mercantile conversions was considered inadequate. But the bluff bow, associated with any type of ramped landing ship, was
not conducive to speed; and these LSTs were therefore given a finer ship-shaped entry. This increased their draught; and they
required a complicated extending ramp, over a 100 ft long, to bridge the gap from ship to shallow water. In the absence of any
actual experience it was thought that the ships would prove very vulnerable in action; and alternative arrangements were there-
fore provided for landing tanks through side ports into LCTs, or by a 40-ton crane on to a jetty. In fact, opinion on LSTs was
so sceptical that provision was made eo adapt them either to tankers or for the carriage of cased aircraft.
When it was later realised that a very large number of LSTs would be required for Ihe European in-
vasion, and the recovery of overseas territory occupied by the enemy, a compromise was sought between the LST(1 )s and the
LCTs- The former were over elaborate, were not wholly satisfactory, nor could they be mass-produced; while the latter were
quite unable to undertake prolonged ocean passages, although they had considerably exceeded expectations
as regards seaworthiness.
An Admiralty plan for an Atlantic TLC was then outlined to the United States Navy, and thereafter they proceeded, in part-
nership with the Royal Navy, to produce the ubiquitous LST(2) -now elevated from a craft to a ship- which met both produc-
tion and seakeeping requirements. Diesel-engined,with the machinery placed well aft, they had the virtue of shallow draught,
with a simple foot-hinged ramp at the bows. For ocean passages they could be ballasted down to a deeper draught; and their all-
welded cellular construction stood up 10 the rigours of their arduous service (see Note I). In common with the LST( 1 ) s they
kedged themselves back imto deeper water after beaching and discharging their load.
Although the LST(2) s fully met operational requirements their production was entirely in American hands. As a result of a dif-
ference of opinion over their allocation, the Royal Navy found itself short of LSTs; and was therefore compelled to embark on a
small programme of its own, but to a modified desigh -the LST(3)- in view of certain limitations. No American diesel engines
were available, and there was a shortage of welding facilities in the British and Canadian yards which were to build them.
The only machinery readily available was the standard reciprocating engines installed in. corvettes and frigates, and these -to-
gether with a large amount of riveting- resulted in larger, heavier, and consequently deeper draught LSTs without any increase
in the military load. The end of hostilities halted this programme, by which time over two-thirds of them had been built.
Note 1: This ballasting arrangements enabled the LST(2) to meet the requirements for shallow draught beaching and deep
draught ocean passages, and it is interesting to recall that the naval architect responsible for the design had previously worked
on submarine ballast systems. The military load was limited 10 500 tons for beaching on a. 1:50 gradient, some 350 tons
under the total deadweight capacity.